A c10se friendship united new Turkey with the Soviet Union. After achieving its complete independence, and while fully preserving it, Turkey observed neutrality between the Soviet Union and the Westem powers. Wiıhoul damaging its friendship towards Moscow, it also kept open all ways leading to the West. il was in this sense that iLjoined the League of Nalions on ı8 July ı932. Sir Percy Loraine, the British ambassador in Ankara, did not believe thal any rapprochement with Turkey would be possible if it were at the expense of Turkey's relationship with Russia. For lhe Turk, he wrole, 'to feel insecure on his land fronlier in the Caucasus, on his long Black Sea liııoral, and al the northem end of the Slraits would be a nightmare.'2 That there had been periods of diffıculty was lme; but the friendship remained. Consistenıly the Turkish Republic had been able to preserve cordial relaıions with lhe Soviet Union, for there had been an identity, ıhough not of ideology, yet certainly of interest belween the lwo. This cordiality was no sentimental affair both Turks and Russians were realisı, and knew that common interesl alone made friendship a practical mode of relationship. Good relaıions with the Soviel Union therefore conlinued to be a cardinal point in Turkish foreign policy. There was no question of Turkey being subordinate to the Soviet Union. Ankara had always shown its naıional independence and doubıless would do so on every occasion. As Tevfik Rüştü Aras, the Foreign Minister, was reporıed to have remarked in the course of an interview wiıh a representaıive of the newspaper Tan on 1 Febmary 1936, 'the misundersıandings which continued for centuries belween Turkey and Russia have disappeared since the fall of the Tsarist regime in Russia and of lhe Sultanale in Turkey. In the Near Easl the unhappy rivalry belween Turk and Russian no longer exists.' So far from harbouring any idea of mainıaining its ancient rivalry wiıh Russia, Turkey, indeed, continued to be concemed by, or at least conscious of, the danger presented to its long strelch of sea and land frontier by Russia in the Black Sea and in the Caucasus. To cover ıhat fronlier good rclations with Moscow were necessaryand dcsirable, but on the condition that Turkey was entirely free to combat Soviet ideologyon its own territory. Turkey, had no room for communism within its own borders, and it had given short shrift to any who tried to practise or preach the doctrines of Karl Marx among its population. 3 The Sovietsl competition with Britain at the Turkish Straits was renewed at Montreux in June-July 1936 with Turkey aloof (having been conciliated beforehand by a promise that the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles would be demilitarised) but with France on the side of Russia trying to obtain egress to secure communications with its ally. The compromise reached was in many respects favourable to the Soviet Union. The Montreux Convention permitted the Russians unlimited exit for surface vessels and tankers in peacetime, subject to the provisions that warships of more than fifteen thousand tons must proceed singIy lhrough the Straits. Soviet submarines were likewise permitted to pass singIy through the Straits by day when returning to their Black Sea bases or en route to dockyards located elsewhere. The control of transit for the vessels of the non-Black Sea powers was achieved by restricting the aggregate tonnage, admitting only 'light warshipsı, and limiting the lcngth of their stay. But the new convention did not provide for complcte security on Russia's southem borders bccause effective control of the Straits was placed in the hands of Turkey which, having obtained the right not only to rearm the zone but also to close the Straits in time of war or of an imminent threat of war, was in a position to allow or impcde passage according to its interests. For the Soviet Union, therefore, the problem of security in the Black Sea remained tied to its political relations with Turkeyand with Turkey's relations with Russia's long-time rivals. 4 The more insistent and more recent of these rivals was Germany intent upon not only economic penetration of the Balkans and the Near East, but also on abilateral agreement with Turkey to by-pass the provisions of Montreux to which Berlin had not been a signatory. Germany succeeded to the extent of obtaining confidential verbal assurances in 1938 that Turkey would not enter into a treaty of mutual assistance which would oblige it to allow passage of warships to assist a victim of 3lbid. Nations Treaty Series, No. 4015, Vol. 173 (1936 -1937 aggression, as well as a promise that at the next conference to revise the Montreux Convention Germany would obtain a seat. 5 On 1 October 1936 Aras informed Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, at Geneva that the Soviet government had lately been showing same dissatisfaction towards their Turkish friends. The Soviets seemed to wish to thrust upon the Turks an excessive friendliness, and Aras had been considering whether there was any actian he could take which would give the Soviets some measure of satisfaction. For this purpose he had in mind to enter into an engagement not to allow warships of an aggressor power to pass through the Straits against the Soviet Union, in return for which Moscow was willing to place its Black Sea fleet at Turkey's disposal in the event of an altack being made against Turkey in the Mediterranean. The view of the British govemment (which Aras invited) was communicated to Fethi Okyar, the Turkish ambassador in London, on 14 October and was to the effect that Aras' proposal either was covered by the provisions of the Montreux Convention, in which case it amounted to nothing new, or was intended to add something to that convention, which could only lead to complications with the other signatory powers and would clearly be open to the gravest objection; and as regards the proposed Russian guarantee to Turkey, that such an understanding would be extremely dangerous and open to grave political objection, since it would amount in fact to something like a Turca-Soviet alliance, to which, as Okyar agreed, there were manifold objections from the Turkish no less than from the European point of view. 6 In the light of Okyar's report, the Turkish government decided to reject the Soviet proposal; it proposcd, however, as Ambassador Numan Menemencioğlu, the Secretary-General of the Yıl/arı: 1935 -1939 (Montreux and Pre-War Years: 1935 -1939 Ministry of Foreign Affairs infonned James Morgan, the British Charge d'Affaires in Ankara on 24 October, to return a soft answer, to the effect that, in order to dissipate a certain vagueness in Artiele 19 of the Montreux Convention, Turkey would let it be known that it would not allow any aggressor to cross its territory from any quarter by land, sea or air, without, however, asking Russia for an undertaking in return. The proposed reply was found by the British government to be open to serious objection on various grounds, since it appeared that Ankara was stilI contemplating a declaration putting a gloss on the Montreux Convention, as well as some kind of understanding with the Soviet Union. On 30 October Morgan accordingly made renewed representations to the Turkish government, with the rcsult that in the course of the speech to the Grand National Assembly by the President Kemal Atatürk on foreign affairs (the occasion chosen for making known the proposed declaration to the Soviet Union), only an anodyne and entirely satisfactory refercnce to the Straits Convention was included.?
4Full text of the Montrcux Straits Convention in League of
Turkey's policy towards the Soviet Union was necessarily conciliatory. it could not afford to antagonise its big ncighbour, and friendship with Russia would remain a corner-stone in the structure of Turkey's foreign policy; yet Turkey was ready to admit vanations of degree in the finnness of the scuing of that vital portion of its architecture. In pursuance of the admitted necessity of conciliating the Soviet government from time to time, Aras, accompanied by Şükrü Kaya, Minister of the Intcrior. visited Moscowon 12-19 July 1937. At the end of a week of meetings, it was announced that the common 'interest of both countries demands the preservation of their relation of friendship in full as a stable element in their foreign policies.'8 Although nothing concrete had been achieved, the visit was regarded in Turkey as having been successful in dispelling rumours of a Turco-Soviet rift and in smoothing over some misunderstandings. In the same order of ideas, the Prime Minister ısmet ınönü, whose stamp on foreign affairs were often seen, made a cordial reference, in his statement on foreign policy to the Grand National Assembly on 14 June ' (1937 ' ( ), London, 1938 ' ( , p. 423. 1937 , to the excellent relations prevailing between the two countries. 9 At the Nyon conference of 14 September 1937, on the policing of the Mediterranean during the Spanish civil war, it quickly became obvious that none of the participant lesser powers wanted Soviet contribution to the provision of antisubmarine piracy patrolling vessels. 'The extent of this feeling which was shared by all eve n by the Turks in spite of their friendly relations with the Soviet Union', Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, Commander-inChief of the British Mediterranean fleet informed London, 'was surprising.'ıo No one should have bcen surprised. The Turks were not anxious to establish a precedent for opening the Straits to the Soviets. AIso, they knew that if the Soviets were allowed out, the Italians would be certain to hold the Turks accountable after the crisis ended. The Russians, very largc\y, were left out in the cold. it was Eden's belief, shared by his naval adviser Pound, that the Soviets were prevented from protesting by their anxiety that the world not leam the extent of their unpopularity and isolation. 11 'The Soviet govemment', Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign Minister said, 'had no axe to grind, and sought only to ensure the elimination of piracy.' However, he wamed, all must understand that the Soviets had as much right in the Mediterranean as anyone else and would protect thei r rights. 12
In the long years of friendship between Turkeyand the Soviet Union there had been cracks, which, however, had never been allowed seıiously to jeopardise relations between Ankara and Moscow. A good understanding with the Soviets had always been a main principlc in the diplomacy of Turkey; yet within that large, unchanging framework there had been abundant opportunity for mutual cıiticism.
91smet ınönü 'nün TBMM ve CHP Kurultaylarında Söylev ve Demeçleri: 1919 -1946 Vol. 14, No. 6, 18 September 1937, pp. 42-43 .
i
On the Russian side there were signs of growing restiveness, mostly accounted for by discontent at the fact that Moscow, since the establishment of very friendly relations between Turkeyand Britain following the signature of the Montreux Straits Convention, was no longer 'the only pebble on the Turkish beach', and partly, after Aras' trip to Milan on 3 February 1937 for talks with the ıtalian Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano, by suspicions that Turkey might succumb to blandishments of Italy. For example, the government newspaper lzvestiya on at least one occasion violent1y attacked Aras and his policy, and what appeared to be disproportionate indignation was shown in the Soviet press at an article in the inOuential Cumhuriyet, in which the editor-in-chief, Yunus Nadi Abalyoğlu, had, it was alleged, misrepresented Soviet integrity in regard to piratical incidents in the Mediterranean. Moreover, it appeared from a conversation between Aras and Loraine towards the autumn of 1937 that relations were by then becoming lcss warm. The former said that this was partly due to the fact that the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had failcd to receive himself and Kaya on the occasion of their visit to Moscow in the summer, and partly to the unwillingness of the Turkish govemment to accept any extension, eve n by implication, of their public obligations to Russia. it later became apparent that the President of the Republic himself was becoming resentful of Soviet methods: Atatürk was, in particular, indignant at the brutal execution of Lev Karakhan, the former Soviet ambassador in Ankara, who had been recommended as a person in whom he could repose complete contidence, and had, indecd, been admitted to terms of personal intimacy wİlh the President unusual for a foreign ambassador.13 it is also to be noted that the omission by Atatürk in his opening speech on 1 November 1937 to the Grand National Assembly of refcrence to Turkey's friendship with the Soviet Union had roused the curiosity of some observers. Those with a suspicious tum of mind saw in it a tuming away from the big neighbour to the north. But that was an exaggerated interpretation. 
Rumours
of a Turco-Soviet mutual assistance pact, strenuously denied by Turkish diplomats during the fırst part of 1938 15 , had been insistently revived at the end of that year after the accession of ınönü to the presideney of the Turkish Republic following the death of Atatürk on LO November 1938. The new President was particularly appreciated in the Soviet Union, where it was believed that he had been dropped from the prcmiership a year ago because of his Soviet orientation.
Russians common1y maintained that ınönü differed from Atatürk on the question of Turkey's relations with Moscow, the new President being alleged to hold more favourable views towards the Soviets than had the Iate President. They thought that ınönü tcnded to look with kindlier eyes on the Soviet Union than did his prcdecessor. Observers were quick to note that Vladimir Poternkin, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, had been the last foreign represcntative to lcave Ankara after Atatürk's funeral, The Times in its edition of 26 November reporting that ınönü had expressly asked him to stay behind to discuss mutual problems. The Turkish President, who obviously wished to dispel certain misconceptions, remembered vividly the good understanding that existed for many years after the Great War between Ankara and Moscow, and was concemed to restore it. There was nothing in such a policy that need disturb other countries which cherishcd Turkey's friendship. Ankara's policy was determined solely by a desire to be both strong and independent. ınönü and his Foreign Minister, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, were at the same time considered in Berlin to be the leading advocates of the Soviet connection. 1 6 But those who gaye them these reputations grossly mistook them. Both statesmen were, above all, Turks and no followers of any predeterm ined ideological and geopolitical theories. 1939, the Turks were giving the Gennans distinct signs that they were moving towards the Russians. On 1 February, Hans KroH, the Gennan Charge d'Affaires in Ankara, reporting that the Russians thought the time had come for reactivating their relations with Turkey, noted that the Soviet ambassador Alcxci Terentiev, who had been on leave, was believed to be returning to Ankara with a comprehensive programme for closer co-operation. Gennany, he advised, needed a big personality for its ambassador in Ankara to counteract Western infiuence, and Menemencioğlu, then in Berlin, should be made to realise the seriousness with which Berlin viewed the Turkish actions. KroH added, however, that both Saraçoğlu and Menemencioğlu had denied as complete illusory the suggestion that Turkey was negotiating with Russia. 1 7
Apparently to dispel whatever was left of the illusion, on 10 February, Menemencioğlu caııed on his Gennan counterpart, Ernst Von Weizsacker, the Gennan Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and of his own accord brought up the subject of the aHeged Black Sea pact. Menemencioğlu told Weizsacker that the initiative had come from Moscow but that Turkey was not interested in concluding a treaty charging it with the defence of the Straits or the Black Sea while the other treaty members rcaped the benefıts. In any case, he assured Weizsacker, Turkey would never make an arrangement contrary to Gennan intcrests. The intervicw ended with a cool Gennan warning about the growing Turco-Soviet intimaey. 1 8
Weizsacker may have thought that Menemeneioğlu did protest too much, for the foııowing day Kraıı again reported signs of a thaw in Turco-Soviet rclations and ascribed them to ınönü's influence. 19 The main point at issue in the Turco-Soviet negotiations was the position with regard to the Black Sea, the importance of which was increased at this juncture by the fact that the Danube, on which the Germans were now relying as a trade routc, fiows into it. Nor were the rumours the cxclusive propcrty of the embassy row. Havas, the French news ageney, filed a story at about the same time alongside a denial by Saraçoğlu. The denial was echoed in Moscow on 20 February. Despite denials, the 17lbid.
ı8Ibid., No. 560, Mcmorandum by Weizsackcr, 10 Fcbruary 1939. ı9lbid., fn. 1. substance of the rumour was real enough, and they consisted of more than diplomatic feelers for it appears that Turkey thought a Black Sea pact substantial and important enough to bring hefore the meeting of the Balkan Entente in February. In fact what had happened was that in February 1939 Litvinov tried to secure the Balkan part of Russia's European frontiers by means of an agreement with Turkeyand Romania. Meeting the Turkish ambassador, Haydar Aktay, at a luncheon, Litvinov broached the idea of a Black Sea security pact to comprise all the powers bordering on the Black Sea. His Romanian colleague, who was also at the luncheon, was said to have treated the idea very coolly. But Aktay was less certain. 20 The Turks appear to have sounded out their a1lies in the Balkan Entente, especially the Greeks, and the maııer was discussed at the annual conference of the Balkan Entente powers at B ucharest. 21 The propasal struck all these Balkan powers as an extremcly unwelcome invitation to choose sides in the war they were nowall coming to accept as inevitable. it was thercforc rejectcd. Instead Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador in London, made it clear to his Romanian collcague, Virgil Tilca, that the Soviet Union would com c to Romania's aid if Germany attacked it. The news was not treatcd with any enthusiasm in Romania, and on 8 March the Soviet news ageney Tass was forced to dcny that any request for assistancc, military or otherwise, had been made by the Romanians. Rather similar approaches had bcen made to the Turks, in the belief that ınönü was definitely pro-Russian. Tentative conversations with Turks had likewise failed to produce any result as yet. 22 Despite these difficulties, it is clear that by the beginning of i939 an alliance with the Soviet Union came high on the list of Turkish priorities. Turkish security could be threatened from two sides: through the Balkans and through the Mediterranean. On the first score the Turkish govemment considcred that no country from the Ballic to the Black Sea was in a position LO aggression unless assured, at the very lcast, of the Sovİets' benevolent neutrality. Co-operation with the Soviets was not for the Turks, as with the West, a matter of conveniencc but amatter of the most essential necessity fırmly rooted İn the geography of the area. The corollary to this condusion was that without Soviet cooperation there was no question of organised defence in eastern Europe. The other area, the eastern Mediterranean, was no less vita!. So long as Italy spoke or thought in terms of its destiny in the Mediterranean, the Turks rcmembered that the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean Sea belonged to Italy and that the heavy fortifıcations in the aero-naval base at Leros were aimed cither to attack westem Anatolia or to disrupt sea traflk in the eastern Mediterranean. It was natural to suppose that Benito Mussolini's govemment would not remain indifferent if a favourable opportunity occurred for attempting to realise Halian aspirations on Turkish terriıory. Jusı as no defence of lhe Balkans could be arranged without Soviet co-operation, equally no defence in the Mediterranean against Italy was conceivable wiıhout British help.23
The West's response to the German occupation of Czechoslovakia on IS March 1939 provided Turkey with the opening it had bcen looking for to arrive at a security arrangement in the Mediterranean to complement lhe discussions aıready underway with the Soviet Union. it seems that sometime between February and March that is, before the Axis coups in Czechoslovakia and Albania Turkey had weighed the advantages of an aıready tentatively formulated agreement wiıh the Soviets in the Black Sea against an, as yet, unformulated agreement wiıh Britain in the Mediterranean, and had decided that the s,econd alternatiye took precedence. This was a seminal decision from which Turkey would not deviate despite blandishments to do so from both Germany and the Soviet Union. 24
On 12 April 1939, fıve days after the occupation of Albania by Italy, Britain offered a treaty of mutual assistance to Turkey. it was clear to Turks that by itself a Black Sea pact with the Soviet Union was insufficienL it would expose the m to German blackmail, and their economy was sensitiye enough to prcssures of that kind. Moreover, the immediate danger now appeared to be coming from other quarters. The Turks appreciated the addition to their security a Black Sea pact would entail, but the risk would only be offset by first obtaining an agreement with Britain providing for security in the Mediterranean where Italy had given ominous proof of bellicosity by invading Albania. The Black Sea pact could then be incorporated as part of a reinsurance policy extending from London to Moscow. These considerations ensured that within limits the Briıish offer would be viewed favourably.25
The Turkish reply was retumed on 15 April. it rcflected with painsıaking clariıy the Turks' reluctance lO abandon their neuırality without crystal-clear safeguards, but iı also reflected the sober decision already arrived al that security could no longer be found in non-alignmenl.
Before taking a posilion against the Axis, Saraçoğlu sıated, Turkey had lo know exaclly what help iı could expect from Britain and France and, eventually, the Soviet Union. Only then could the malter of help to Romania beyond the provisions of the Balkan Entente be studied. Turkey would cooperaıc fully wiıh Britain in the Balkans or the Mediıerranean providing the latler fırst helped in the defence of the Straits, coordinated its overall military strategy wiıh Turkeyand helped mediate Bulgaro-Romanian differences. 26 lt was in these circumstances that Vyacheslav Molotov, Soviet Chairman of the Council of Minisıers, first became active in foreign affairs. On the same day that the Turks replied the British offer of treaıy, he teIcgraphed directly to the Soviet ambassador in Ankara, proposing a Turco-Soviet meeting as soo n as possibIc, in their infiuence to produce a more co-operative attitude in Sofia. 32 Before he left, Potemkin had an audience with the PresidenL ınönü urged him to advise Moscow to take whatever it was offered by the WesL33
The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister was more than a Httle peeved to find that the British negotiations with Turkey had gone as far as they had. He was also worried by the very marked reserve the Turks showed towards Germany. as comparcd with their open hostility to Italy. The Turks. by Potemkin's own account, treated him openly, giying him a somewhat edited version of their talks with the Romanians and their exchanges with the British. Their version emphasised the Turkish reluctance to be involved in any guarantee system against Germany which was not backed by Soviet arms and Soviet aid. They proposed a direct Turco-Soviet agreement to make the Anglo-Soviet and Turco-British agreements. whose conclusion they anticipated, into a triangular relationship. They asked for the terms of the Soviet propasal of 17 April to the British for a triple Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance against aggression; and they asked. as Potemkin reported, for Soviet blessing for their negotiations with Britain. They asked too for Soviet aid in pressing Romania to cede the Dobrudja to Bulgaria so as to include the latter in the Balkan Entente. They discussed a separate Black Sea security pact. Potemkin duly approved their stand in the Turco-British negotiations. 34 The joint communique issued at the conclusion of Potemkin's mission, that Turkeyand Russia would 'pursue their respectiye and parallel efforts for the safeguarding of pcace and security'. in the light of subsequent events. becomes charged with more than a little irony.35
With regard to the Turco-Soviet negotiations it is rclevant to ask why. given the favourable dispositian all around. nothing was concluded. Here one enters into the realm of spcculation. but one hypothesis seems more consonant with the available evidence: that the Soviet Union regarded its negotiations with Turkey as exclusive (whereas Ankara saw them as complementary with security arrangements with the West); that the Soviet Union traditionally considered Britain as a competitor rather than an ally; that despite this Moscow still might have concluded a pact of mutual assistance with Turkey if three conditions had been fulfılled. These were, fırstly, that the Balkan countries show signs of becoming united to resist German aggression and welcome Soviet help, and, secondly, that the Turkish negotiations with Britain be not so far advanced that the Soviet Union could not make İts peculiar requirements prevaiI, and lastly that, in toto, b01h Balkan and Weslem powers display enough evidence of strength to induce the Soviet Union to join their side. As these conditions did not appear Iikely to be fulfılled it is fair to suppose that the lradiıional Russian hostiIity towards Britain as well as the exclusiveness of Turco-Soviet negolialions gained the upper hand and, for the whiIe, the Soviet Union chose lO bide iıs time. This hypoıhesis seems confırmed by the fact ıhaı Potemkin was visibly shaken by the advanced state of Turco-British negotiations. 36 As indicated earlier, Paternkin confıded to Massigli that his imention had been to synchronise the Turco-Anglo-French and the Turco-Soviet negotiations. Given the advanced state of the former his comment could only have one meaning: to slow the m down. He had as Iittle success on this score as he had had with Bulgaria. He had arrived in Ankara on 28 April and by 2 May there was no indication that he had placed any serious proposals before his hosts. He appeared to be temporising whiIe awaiting instructions. After the fırst few days, the British ambassador in Ankara Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen was quick to observe a growing note of distrust in Saraçoğlu's allusions to his guest. 37 The third Soviet requirement the overall prospects of successful defiance of Germany was equally no closer. Poıemkin registered considerable dismay at the fact that the British reply to the Soviet proposals for a comainment front showed liltle consideraıion of Soviet needs, and 36B.D.F.P., Ser. 3, Vol. 5, No. 322, Ankara 1939 -1940 , Paris, 1964 Clearly, although no suggestion of an open break was allowed, the visit had not bome out its expectations: Potemkin professed himself satisfied in a conversation with KnatchbullHugessen but added significantly that everything now depcnded on the British reply to the Soviet propasals on the containment front and on the composition of inter-Balkan differences. 39 The British ambassador was surprised by the deficiency of concrete results during the visit. He asked Saraçoğlu about the proposed Black Sea pact. It was amatter for later realisation, the Foreign Minister replied; the agreements with Britain and France were to be concluded first. When the moment came, 'the Soviet Union could then be incorporated'.40 Poternkin, on his part, made no effort then or later either to dissuade the Turks from signing the joint declaration for mutual assistance with Britain or to accelcrate the negotiations for an agreement between Turkeyand the Soviet Union. On his return to Moscow he gaye the general impression that the Soviet Union was prepared to lcave the Turco-British negotiations alone until the fate of the Soviet Union's own negotiations with the West was scUlcd.
Meanwhilc, Turkey continued to search for the illusive Soviet conncetion to parallel its accommodation with Britain. Turkey fully appreciated the potential weight of Russia in world affairs, and particularly in Near Eastcm questions. That is not to say, howevcr, that it readily subscribed to the Russian view upon the indivisibility of peacc. Instead of been doctrinaire Turkey was wholly empirical in its policy, and might be considered to lean towards the British thesis rather of immcdiately buttressing the forces of peace where peace was threatened than of plcdging aid where aid was not at present called for. The Turks continued to believe a Germano-Soviet rapprochement unlikely, and thought that such rumours were only a Russian attempt to light a fire under the British. 43 By the middle of July, however, they were becoming anxious at the obvious lack of progress towards an understanding bctween its Western allies and the Soviet Union. 44 Despite this, Ankara considered that whatever the finaı outcome of Russia's taıks with the West, this need not preclude a satisfactory Turco-Soviet arrangemenl. Turkeyand the Soviet Union were friends of long standing, and that amutual interest which united them was the determination to prevent the Germans from approaching closer to the Black Sea. 45 In the middle of July, Stalin began to push hard for an understanding with the Turks. On i8 July, he warned the Turkish government much to its annoyance that signature of a TurcoSoviet pact was a precondition for an understanding with Britain and France. 46 fashion, hefore putting forth a draft of their own, the Russians submitted a questionnaire to the Turkish government. They wanted to know whether Turkey preferred the projected pact to apply only to aggression or go funher, possibly as Saraçoğlu surmised, into the area of indirect aggression. They asked whether the pact should be limited to land only to the defence of the contracting or also to cases when the contracting panies were involved in hostilities owing to the obligations; in that case Turkey was asked to state to which other countries it had obligations. 52
The timing of the Soviet representation was significant. it came three months after the last official approach to Turkey; it came when negotiations with the West were about to reach an impasse; it came when a tumabout in Russian policy threatened to leave the Soviet Union's southem flank exposed. In the next week the tumabout was confirmed by Ribbentrop's night flight to Moscow and by the ensuing pact. Soviet policy was striking out in a new direction, though on paths well traversed by previous generation of Russian diplomats. 53 The most remarkable aspect of the new Soviet policy was the desire to cash as quickly as possible the promissory notes exacted as a price for the Germano-Russian Non-aggression Pact of 23 August 1939 and to take whatever advantage from the dislocation caused by the coming war. Both objcctives were pressing, on the one hand because the complexion of the war might change and on the other because of the necessity to strengthen the country's strategic position vis-a-vis Germany. Both, however, were compellingly circumscribed by a third and over-riding consideration:
in no case could the Soviet Union become embroilcd in hostilities with a great power. If this analysis is accepted it serves to explain why the Soviet Union, at a time it was about to make its first major territorial acquisition in Poland, should be interested in allaying complications on its southem frontiers. On the basis of what can be inferred from the later actions of the Soviet government, an immediate altcration of the status quo at the Straits must have been a tantalising temptation. But the certainty that a coup in that area would automatically involve the country in war, and the fear that Turkish policy might independently lead to an extension of the conflict in the Middle East caused the Soviet govemment to act energetically to support the peace in an area where its inıeresls were so extensive and so vilal thaı, if threatened, the counıry mighı be forced to abandon its neuıraliıy.55
Some ıime during the last week in August Turkey replied to the Soviet queslionnaire: the proposed pact would have 'effect within a limited compass and ıherefore have a limited liability' but it could be concluded on a 'wide conception of aggression' and cover 'naval and land wars'; Turkey's engagements were those envisaged by the Balkan Entente and the Turco-Allied declarations. 56 At the beginning of September Terentiev submiıted a formula whereby the two countries might sign an agreement in principle pending the conclusion of the formal treaty. This procedure was acceptable to lhe Turkish government provided the Soviet Union accepted first that mutual assistance would be operative against aggression by a European power in the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Strails, and secondly thal Turkey could not be obliged to lake any aclion leading to a conflicl with Britain and France. 57
The fırsl condiıion reflected Turkey's concem wiıh ils own securily and echoed the similar provision incorporated in the draft tripaıtite pacı wiıh the West; the second soughl to harmonise those engagemenıs wiıh a securily arrangemem wiıh the Sovieı Union. The problem was to reconcile these undcrtakings in a situaLİon in which, should Germany allack in the Balkans, Turkey would be called upon by lhe allies to oppose the atlack at the same ıime that it was asked by the Soviet Union to abet il. There are two versions 55lbid. , La Turquie devanJ la Guerre, p. 268. of Terentiev's answer to these Turkish conditions. According to Massigli, who got it from Saraçoğlu, Terentiev had replied he had no instructions in the matter. 58 According to Necmettin Sadak, at that time a deputyand a journalist and after the Second World War Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Soviet ambassador had answered that the Turkish conditions would have been acceptablc while the Soviet Union and the West were stili engaged in conversations. But after their breakdown the situation had changed, although it was stiıı possible to envisage an agreement on the Straits and the Balkans. Again according to Sadak, it was finally decided that negotiations should be primarily concerned with the Black Sea and the Straits but with a provision for consultation regarding the Balkans and a reservation, which Turkey insisted had to be inserted in the projected pact, that 'any obligations thereby assumed by Turkey would not involve it in an anned conflict wiıh either of the two Westem powers.'59
S61'he fu\\ teıı.t of the rcply is in MonJreux and
The above compromise was evidently accepıed by the Soviet Union because on 8 Sepıember Saraçoğlu showed a scepıical Massigli a draft project and on the 16 th Saraçoğlu's trip to Moscow was publicly announced. The departure date was left open in the hope that in the meantime agreement might be reached on the outstanding financial dauses of the tripartite pact. But the time was too short. Saraçoğlu before leaving on 25 September assured Massigli that Turkish policy would not change as a result of the trip and that the tripartite treaty would be signed on his return.60 Despite Saraçoğlu's assurances, there could be little doubt that the Soviet turnabout had made nonsense of the Turkish policy to reconcile engagements with the West wiıh friendship in Moscow. Turkey would now had to revise its position. Evidenl1y Gennany was counting heavily on the Soviet Union's collaboration and nowhere more so than in Turkeyand the Straits where the geographical posilion and the old friendship with Ankara made the Soviet Union uniquely effıcient in applying pressure. Gennany's hopes secmed to be malched by Russia's disposiıion. Berlin had seen an opening for a representation when it cam e to know at the end of August of the Turco-Soviet discussion for a Black Sea pact. Immediately the German ambassador in Moscow, Count Friedrich Von Schulenburg, was charged with drawing Molotov's auention to the desirability of complete Turkish neutrality and the German representative was grateful to receiye an assurance on 2 September that the Soviet Union was ready to work to that end: in Stalin's and Molotov's view Moscow's security requiremenL~in the Black Sea could be reconciled with Berlin's desires by inserting a provision in the projected pact thal Russia should not be required to take action against Germany, in which case Turkey would surely have to remain neuıral in aBaıkan war. 62
On the other hand, Saraçoğlu had three very specific objectives. The first was to ascertain to what extent the nonaggression pact with Germany had altered Soviet policy in general and in the Balkans in particular. The second was to arrive at a securily pact with the Soviet Union which would not be incompatible with his engagements towards the West. And thirdly he undertook to ascertain the Soviet reaction to a projected neulral bloc of Balkan states. His bargaining position was sırong. The treaty with the Wesl was almost ready for signature and France had extended a form al promise of help and solidarity should he be subject to Soviel pressure. In accepting this assurancc, ınönü had pledged that if the Soviet Union asked Turkey to limit lhe ıreaıy with the allies to the castem Mediıerranean and come to a separate agreement on the Slraits and the Balkans, the reply was going to be negative. 63
The Turkish government had very definite ideas abouı what it wanled from the Soviet Union. Basically, it sought a non- i) In the case of an aggrcssion by a European power directed in the arca of the Black Sea, including the Straits, against Turkey or the Soviet Union, high contracting parties will effcctively cooperate and send each other all aid and assistance in their power.
ii) In the case of an aggression by a European power against Turkey or against the Soviet Union in the Balkan area, high contracting parties will effectively co-operate and lend each other all assistance in their power.
iii) The engagements by Turkey in virtue of Artides i and 2 of the above cannot force that country into an action having for effect or Icading to the consequence of putting it in armed conflict with Britain and France. iv) Suggested treaty to be for a duration of fifteen years with tacit renewal every five years. 64 Saraçoğlu presented this draft treaty to Molotov on the fırst day of discussions, 30 September 1939. Molotov gave to Saraçoğlu a document of his own. It wac; a list of proposed amendments to the Montreux Convention. When he realised what it was, Saraçoğlu refused to take it, touch it, or discuss it. This exchange set the tone for the remainder of the conversations. The truth was, as mentioned previously, that the Russians had aıready promised the Germans to use their influence to draw the Turks away from the West and regarded the talks more in this light than as an attempt to come to some mutually beneficial bilateral accommodation with the Turks. Von Schulenburg, one of the main architects of the GermanoRussian pact, was in constant contact with Kremlin during Saraçoğlu's visit to Moscow and pressed Molotov to heed German desiderata. Soviet Icaders were willing to follow his advice. Having chosen neutrality in the Germano-Westem war, Russia was ready to aid Germany in neutralising the Black Sea region, and thus to bar the opening of a second front in the Balkans. Such a front would bring hostilities close to the Soviet border, a situation Russia wanted to avoid. Moreover, the presence of an Anglo-French fleet in the Black Sea a possible result of an a1liance with Turkey might create serious security problems for "collaborationist" Russia. Thus, both to appease Germany and to keep the conflict away from its borders, Russia desired Turkish neutrality.65
On the second day of discussions, i October, Stalin himself appeared.66 He made very plain that he objected to the TurcoAnglo-French tripartite treaty as negotiated to date. He thought that the treaty should commit the Turks only to consultation, and not to action, in regard to the guarantees to Greece and Romania. Further, he thought that in the event that the Soviet Union went to war with Britain and France, the treaty should be suspended for the duration. 67
Stalin retumed to the question of the proposed Montreux modifıcations. The substance of Soviet demands was that whether in peace or war, the Turks belligerent or non-belligerent, Turks and Soviets should decide in common, in each case, if passage through the Straits of a non-riverine power would be permitted. Non-riverine powers would be limited to a fıfth of the presently authorised tonnage. 68 Ships would not be allowed in for humanitarian work or in execution of a League decision unless the Soviets participated in the decision. Finally, there would be no further revision except by bilateral agreement between Turkeyand the Soviet Union. 69 Saraçoğlu agreed to pass on to Britain and France the Russian demands for modifıcation of the tripartite treaty, but was not hopeful of their rcsponse. Straits revision, he rcfused to discuss. Turkey, he vowed, would never repeat the mistake of Hünkar iskelesi. If this were Russia's last word, he said, then he would go home.7°"Saraçoğlu is perfectly correct", answered Stalin disanningly: "This project is just too grotesque".71 Stalin turned, lastly, to the nature of the alignment between Turkeyand the Soviet Union. The Russians, he said, would guarantee the Turks except in the case of Gennan attaek. In this event, the Turco-Soviet agreement would be suspended. 72
In Ankara Stalin's modifications were considered a stiff, but nonetheless acceptable price to pay for Soviet amity. Instructions were sent to Saraçoğlu to prepare a draft Turco-Soviet treaty on the understanding that the suggested modifications to the tripartite treaty would be made as soon as London and Paris gave their approval. Such approval proved to be much more difficult to obtain than the Turkish governmenl anticipated. In the Wc st, where earlier in the year the proposed Turco-Soviet pact had bcen seen as essential to the cOnlainment front, option was sharply divided.73
In Paris the official announcement of Russia's neutrality, which arrived the same day that Russian troops marched inlo Poland, secmed \ike a monstrous joke. Immediately an earlier promise of aid to all Balkan counlries menaced by Gennan expansion was amplified to include Russian impcrialism as wcll. 74 In the Quai d'Orsay, there was no doubt that Stalin's modifications were inlended to divest the tripartite treaty of all substance and to render the guaranlee to Romania inopcrative. Consequently on 3 October the French Prime Minister, Edouard Daladicr, infonned the Turkish ambassador in Paris in no uncertain tenns that France had no intention of altering the text as it then stood. It was against France's intcrests, the Quai tclegraphed Massigli, to agree to what amounled to a neutralisation of the Balkans. London, on the other hand, toak a more flexible line, partly bccause it never shared Paris' optimism about a Balkan front. Britain would be pleased to see continued friendly rclations bctween Turkeyand the Soviet Union, The majority opinion in the British war cabinet was to refuse revision and to insist that the triple alliance stand as aıready initialled by Britain and France. The onlyother course would be to abandon it altogether and negotiate a new treaty limited to the Mediterranean. The British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, however, was not anxious to abandon what had been achieved only with difficulty. He convinced the cabinet that the Soviet objections should be admitted, but that the British govemınent must receive full information in regards to the proposed Turco-Soviet agreement and the assurance that Turkey would be ablc to enter the war if it chose to do so.7 7 As remarked be fo re , Paris, in contrast, had com c to the conclusian that the Soviet demands should be refused and the treaty signed as it stood. The French 751bid .• p. 282. 761bid .• pp. 283-284. 77CAB 65(2. WC 39 (39). 6 Octobcr 1939. agreed, however, to follow the British Icad in this matter.78 Puzzled, and with considerable misgivings, the British government advised the Turks that it would accept the Russian reservations if the Turks wished it. Had this approval not been forthcoming, in Erkin's opinion, a rupture with the Soviet Union would have been certain, rapid and rancorous.7 9
On 14 October, the Turks fortified by Britain's reluctant acquiescence, agreed to Stalin's demand that the tripartite treaty would bind them only to consultation in the event of a threat to Greece and Romania. Turkey would not, however, Saraçoğlu informed Molotov, agree to the German reservation to be placed on the proposed Turco-Soviet treaty. To do so would be to embrace a daydream because Turkey's most probable and most dangerous enemies were currently Germany and Italy. If Germany attacked, the reservation would suspend the treaty; if Italy attacked, Germany would be behind its ıtalian ally and the reservation would again come into play. Such a treaty would therefore be entirely without value. Unfortunately, said Molotov, he had promised this reservation to Ribbentrop, then in Moscow, and if the Turks would not agree to it, then he doubted that a treaty would be possible. 80 What of Straits revision?
Molotov asked, reminding Saraçoğlu that he had promised the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal KIimenti Yoroshilov, earlier that Turkey was prepared to proceed bilateraııy with the Russians in this matter. Saraçoğlu denied that this was so and blamed Yoroshilov's misunderstanding on a translation error. Even so, Molotov asked, how, if Montreux were allowed to stand, could Turkey use iL" rights under the present regime to benefit the Soviet Union? Saraçoğlu refused to consider this last. Such a course, he said, would be illegal and ilIegitimate. Wou1d the Turkish Foreign Minister agree to a regulatory draft in the future? Saraçoğlu again refused. Would he at lcast give a verbal promise to the same effect? Saraçoğlu was adamant. Would Turkey pledge neutrality towards Bulgaria in all instances? The reply was the same. The day's session broke off at the point without 78Ibid., 43 (39) In Ankara the Ministry of Foreign Affairs now lost its patience. Instructions were se nt to Saraçoğlu not to budge on any of the above points and to return home if the Russians insisted on them. Privatc1y Menemencioğlu wondered whether the Soviet Union was now employing the same techniques with his Foreign Minister as it had with the al1ied mission in August. At this diplomaıic tug of war, Turkey drew the line. 83 Meanwhile the Turkish press was fol1owing, noı wiıhout anxiety, lhe movements which were taking place in Moscow. The newspapers expressed surprise at Ribbentrop's presence in Moscow simultaneously wiıh that of Saraçoğlu, particularly as Turkey had received no previous infonnalion of his visit. There was no doubt that the govemment and lhe public were puzzlcd. if not piqued, at the cool reception accorded to ıheir Foreign Minister. Relying on ıhe cordialily of their relaıions wiıh the Sovieı Union lhe Turkish govemment had accepted wiıh alacrity the inviıaıion to sen d its Foreign Minister to Moscow, and ıhe press had foreshadowed the prompı conclusion of a pact of mulual securiıy wiıh the Soviet Union. Saraçoğlu was also kept waiting in the background during the visits of successive delegations from the Baltic countries. In these circumstances the Turkish press comment was in general 81lbid. 82lbid. 83lbid.
restrained, but a fecling of irritation was voiced by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, one of the best known and respected members of the former Union and Progress Party and a joumalist of great taIent, in the Istanbul daily Yeni Sabah: "Our Soviet friends appear to have invited our Foreign Minister to Moscow for a pleasant autumn holiday. In this period of crisis, when the states of the world are agitated by a thousand possibiHties, our Foreign Minister has be en working very hard and is naturaııy tired. Wc appreciate the consideration of our friends and neighbours in freeing him from his preoccupations and extcnding to him their courteous hospitality. No doubt, when time can be spared from the affairs of the Estonian gatekeeper and the Chinese dragoman, the friendly negotiations with us will continue."84
On 17 October, Stalin put in his second and final appearance. He insisted that the suspcnsive elause on the tripartite treaty must cover both Russia and Germany. If the Turks would permit no revision of Montreux, then, he said, they must at Icast promise to invoke Artiele 22 of the Convention to deny passage to the vessels of non-littoral powers. 85 Soviet Foreign Minister stated he could not give up the German clause; Saraçoğlu repIied he could not accept it without amending the tripartite treaty out of existence. Molotov renewed his request for a protocol changing Articles 20 and 2 i of the Montreux Convention to prevent allied warships and troop camers entering the Black Sea while allowing Russian ships into the Mediterranean. The Turkish Foreign Minister refused to entertain giying up an international agreement to come to a bilateral arrangement with the Soviets on the Straits. The few pallid assurances which Moscow was offering were simply insufficient to offset the cost of the concessions they required. Saraçoğlu then announced his intention to return home: if the Soviet government was still disposed to conclude a pact of mutual assistance according to the original proposals.
further negotiations could take place through the normal diplomatic channels in Ankara. Massigli and KnatchbullHugessen were informed by telephone later in the day by Menemencioğlu that negotiations had broken down in Moscow and that the tripartite treaty should be signed immediately in its original form. The poIitical treaty. the secret protocols and the special arrangements were signed on the afternoon of 19 üctoher, as soon as Saraçoğlu had left Soviet soiL. 88 Considering the basic divergence in objectives, it is no wonder that Saraçoğlu's mission to Moscow failcd. It was an extraordinary visit in the annals of diplomacy, because the Foreign Minister remained away from home for almost a month at a time of great international crisis. His trip coincided with the visit that Ribbentrop paid to the Soviet Union. The German minister, who had com c to discuss the division of eastcm Europe into the German and Soviet spheres, was given priority in Moscow, and Saraçoğlu was kept waiting for weeks bctween the mectings. By 88The principal sources for these negotiations remain Erkin and Massigli. Erkin is essential for discussion of the Stalin -Saraçoğlu talks in October 1939. of which he was the sole witness on the Turkish side to publish an account an account which, due to the silence of Turkish archives. stands alone. Erkin was then the Director General of the Political Department of the Turkish M inistry of Foreign Affairs and he soon rose to prominence. The negotiations were summed in Molotov's spcech to the Supreme Soviet on 3 i October 1939 in Jane Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, London, 1948. Vol. iii, pp. 388 that time Turco-AngIo-French conversations for a definitive alliance were far advanced, and most of the major points of agrcement settled. In order to reconcile its Westem friendship with Soviet objections, Turkey was willing to formuIate its proposed alliance with Britain and France in such a way that it wouId explicitly exclude any common anti-Soviet action. This concession was made with the approval of the British and French, who fully understood Turkey's difficult pasition. Such an arrangement might prove satisfactory to Russia, and at one time during the Moscow negotiations the Soviet leaders seemed to be ready to conclude a pact on that basis. But German pressure prevailed, and Moscow insisted that, in its treaty of alliance with the West, Turkey must promise to refrain from engaging in war with Germany. This, of course, was unacceptable to Saraçoğlu, as it would render the Turco-Anglo-French alliance meaningless. Germany preferred to see no Turco-Soviet pact at all than a pact which would result in safeguards to Russia only, and not to itself. Anxious to oblige the Germans, the Soviet leaders finally informed Saraçoğlu that they were not interested in the pact. 89
The net result of Saraçoğlu's visit to Moscow was that he leamed, much to his uneasiness, of arather pronounced degree of Germano-Russian co-operation and of consequent Soviet opposition to Turkish links with the West. The trip impressed upon Turkish Icadership the need for great caution in their international relations but did not deflect them from the basic course of cooperation with the West.
The nervous glances east in the northem neighbour were evident in the Turkish press. A journalist much in ınönü's confidence, Falih Rıfkı Atay, in the semi-official Ulus wrote that negotiations failcd with the Soviets because of the clash between obligations to Britain, the Soviet position, and the Montreux Convention. But he stressed that this did not mean the end of the Turco-Soviet friendship. He underlined that any undertaking Turkey went into would be to preserve peace and security in its own area: "This unchanging principle of Turkish foreign policy is sure to be appreciated by our friends the Soviets."90 Yalçın in the 89lbid. See alsa George Lenc7.0wski, The Middle East in World Affairs, New York, 1956 , p. 137. 90Falih Rıl1c1 Atay, Ulus, 18 October 1939 Yeni Sabah said that Turkey had tried hard to reconcile AngloFrench views with those of the Soviets, unfortunatcly this had proved impossiblc.9 1 What had the Russians been after? Firstly, it scems obvious that they wishcd to remove all substance from the tripartite treaty, and if this were not possible, to ncgate its possiblc operation against the Soviet Union. Secondly, the proposed amendments. tak en together, could not but have reduced Turkey to somcthing likc political vassalage.
Thirdly, certain of the amcndmcnts, in partieular the Bulgarian reservation, would have nul1ified the Balkan Entente. What had the Russians wanted? They wished to supply a Finnish solution to the problem of Turkeyand to return Turkey to the state of relative rcliance in which it had existed prior to 1932. The views of the Turkish press to that effect are enlightening. On the subject of the Russo-Finnish dispute, which the Turks closely followed, Ragıp Emeç wrote in popular S on Posta that the SovieLe;had made claims on Finland and negotiations were in progress. Of the Finns he said: "Because theyare a long way from nourishing illusions, while negotiating with the Russians on one hand they have been taking the precautions necessitated by circumstance Ö Finland wants to live in pcace with the world. But nor does it seem at all Iikely to make saerifices of its national integrity and frecdom." Emeç hoped negotiations would Icad to a satisfactory solution. 92 The Turks obviously saw a potentia! similarity bctween Finns and themselves. The paral1els between the Turkish and the Finnish cases are suggestive. Finland too received an urgent invitation to send a plenipotentiary to Moscow to "diseuss conerete political matters" in Octobcr 1939. Like the Turks, the Finnish delegation was confronted with impossible demands border modifications and the acceptance of a Soviet base in the south of the country; unlike the Turkish case, Finnish refusal 1ed to virtual1y immediate hostilities with the Soviet Union. Saraçoğlu's failure in Moscow to reconciIe Turkey's two big friends the British and the Russians marks the end of the period during which Ankara attempted to juggle the two relationships. This heraıds a new phase in the development of Turkish foreign policy with the Soviet Union now becoming a major worry. A Turco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance had proved incompatible with the other undertakings aıready entered into by the two parties, and, furthermore, it appcared certain that the Soviet Union was embarking on a policy of expansion reminiscent of its Tsarist antecedents. The Western aIIies, for their part, saw their last hopes for a link with the Soviet Union dashed, but they were grateful that the tripartite treaty was signed in its original, unamended form.
Following the signature of the Turco-Anglo-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance the Turks found themselves solidly placed, on papcr, in one of the belligerent camps. They had nourished strong hopes of including the Soviet Union in this arrangement, but now they found it not onlyoutside but also in a position of cooperation with Germany. KremIin was highly critical of the tripartite treaty when it was offıcially announced, and Molotov in his speech of 31 October 1939 made vocal his disapproval of Turkey's action. The Soviet Foreign Minister stated that the Turkish government, by its alliance with the Western democrades had openly abandoned its policy of neutrality and had entered the orbit of war, adding that Turkey might one day repent of its deed. Relations between Turkeyand the Soviet Union thus entered into a new period of mutual distrust and tension.
